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pAbstract
The theory of factor demand has important implications for the study of the impact
of immigration on wages. This paper derives the theoretical implications in the
context of a general equilibrium model where the wage impact depends on the
elasticity of product demand, the rate at which the consumer base expands as
immigrants enter the receiving country, the elasticity of supply of capital, and the
elasticity of substitution among inputs of production. The constraints imposed by
the theory can be used to check the plausibility of the many contradictory claims
that appear throughout the immigration literature.
JEL codes: J23; J61; F22
Keywords: Immigration; Wage impact of immigration; Factor demand theory1. Introduction
The resurgence of large-scale immigration motivated the development of a large litera-
ture that examines how labor markets in both receiving and sending countries react to
the immigration-induced change in supply. The textbook model of a competitive labor
market suggests that higher levels of immigration should lower the wage of competing
workers and increase the wage of complementary workers, at least in the short run. Des-
pite the common-sense intuition behind these predictions, the empirical literature seems
full of contradictory results. Some studies claim that immigration has a substantial impact
on wages in receiving and sending countries (e.g., Borjas 2003; Mishra 2007), while other
studies claim the impact is negligible (Card 2005; Ottaviano and Peri 2012).
This paper takes a step back from the empirical debate and asks a simple question:
What does factor demand theory have to say about the potential wage impact of
immigration-induced supply shifts? Since Marshall’s time, economists have had a good
understanding of the variables that generate elastic or inelastic labor demand curves,
and how the elasticity of labor demand is affected by substitution and scale effects1.
Unfortunately, much of the empirical literature on the wage impact of immigration
(particularly in the 1990s) disregarded practically all of these insights, and instead took
a data-mining approach: running regressions or estimating difference-in-differences
models to examine if the wage evolution in labor markets most affected by immigra-
tion differed from that observed in other markets. Few of these studies were guided or
informed by the implications of factor demand theory.
More recently, beginning with Card (2001) and Borjas (2003), the literature has
taken a turn and begun to pay closer attention to the underlying economics of the
problem2. This paper derives the implications of factor demand theory for the study ofBorjas; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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the question in the context of a general equilibrium model that explicitly introduces
such factors as the elasticity of product demand, the rate at which the consumer base
expands as immigrants enter the country, the elasticity of supply of capital, and the
elasticity of substitution across inputs of production.
The analysis makes two contributions. First, the model generates a closed-form solution
of the wage effect of immigration, allowing us to easily generate back-of-the-envelope esti-
mates under a large number of potential scenarios. Not surprisingly, factor demand theory
imposes severe constraints on the potential sign and numerical value of these presumed
wage effects. These constraints can be used to check the plausibility of the many contra-
dictory claims that appear throughout the empirical immigration literature.
Second, the model demonstrates that the impact of immigration on the wage level in
the receiving country depends on completely different parameters than its impact on
the wage distribution—as long as the analysis builds in technical restrictions that are
widely used in the empirical literature. The “separability” of these results again allows
simple back-of-the-envelope calculations that suggest the possible range of estimates
for the distributional impact of immigration.
It is important to emphasize at the outset that by deriving the wage impact of immi-
gration in the context of a competitive labor market, the analysis may be overlooking
potentially interesting implications introduced by the possibility that some (many?) im-
migrants are employed by firms with market power. Unfortunately, the implications of
immigration-induced supply shifts in the context of imperfectly competitive labor mar-
kets have not yet been fully developed.
Similarly, the analysis uses the “standard” assumption of constant returns to scale to
derive the implications of supply shocks for the wage structure. It is obvious that the
implications could be quite different when there are either economies or diseconomies
of scale. The growing literature that examines the impact of high-skill immigration
(Waldinger 2010; Borjas and Doran 2012) attempts to determine if high-skill immi-
grants impart sufficiently strong human capital externalities on the pre-existing work-
force to generate increasing returns. In contrast, there has been remarkably little
interest (Rasmussen 2013) in examining the impact of immigration in the presence of
fixed factors that lead to decreasing returns.
2. Preliminaries: homogeneous labor in a one-good closed economy
It is instructive to begin with the simplest model of a competitive labor market: a single
aggregate good, Q, is produced using a production function that combines capital (K)
and a homogeneous labor input (L). The aggregate production function, Q = f(K, L), is
assumed to be linear homogeneous. The relevant derivatives of the production function
exist, with fK and fL > 0, and fKK and fLL < 0. Linear homogeneity implies that fKL > 0.
The elasticity of complementarity for any input pair i and j is cij = fij f / fi fj.
3. Linear
homogeneity implies that a weighted average of these elasticities equals zero:
X
j
sjcij ¼ 0; ð1Þ
where sj is the income share accruing to input j.
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its value of marginal product:
r ¼ p f K ; ð2aÞ
w ¼ p f L; ð2bÞ
where r is the price of capital and w is the wage rate.
Consider two polar situations: the short run and the long run. By definition, the
capital stock is fixed in the short run and the price of capital is fixed in the long run.
Suppose an immigrant influx increases the size of the workforce. By differentiating
Equations (2a) and (2b), it is easy to show that in the short run:4
d logr
d logL

dK¼0
¼ sL cKL > 0: ð3Þ
d logw
d logL

dK¼0
¼ sL cLL < 0; ð4Þ
The derivative d log w/d log L will be called the “wage elasticity” of immigration. The
short-run wage elasticity must be negative because cLL < 0. As noted above, linear
homogeneity implies that capital and labor are complements, hence cKL > 0. This com-
plementarity ensures that capital becomes more valuable as the immigration-induced
supply shock increases the size of the workforce. Immigration has a short-run distribu-
tional impact: wealth is shifted away from workers and towards those who own the
productive resources in the immigrant-receiving country.
The distributional impact, however, disappears in the long run. Differentiating the
marginal productivity condition in Equation (2a) implies that the immigration-induced
change in the capital stock is:
d logK
d logL

dr¼0
¼ − sLcKL
sK cKK
¼ 1; ð5Þ
where the last equality follows from Equation (1). Linear homogeneity implies that the
capital stock and the size of the workforce will both grow (in percentage terms) by
exactly the same amount. The long-run wage elasticity is then given by:
d logw
d logL

dr¼0
¼ sK cKL þ sLcLL ¼ 0; ð6Þ
where the last equality also follows from (1). In the long run, the receiving country’s
wage is independent of immigration. The intuition is clear: The linear homogeneity of
the production function implies that input prices depend only on the capital/labor ra-
tio. The assumption that the price of capital is constant implies that the capital/labor
ratio is also constant. If immigrants increase the size of the workforce by 10 percent,
the capital stock must eventually also increase by 10 percent. In the end, the wage must
return to its pre-immigration equilibrium.
It is possible to obtain some insights into the potential magnitude of the short-run
wage elasticity by specifying a functional form for the production function. Suppose, in
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where 0 < α < 1, and δ ≤ 1. The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is de-
fined as σ = 1/(1 − δ). The short-run wage elasticity is then given by:5
d logw
d logL

dK¼0
¼ − 1−δð Þ sK : ð7Þ
The theory has very specific implications about the numerical value of the short-runwage effect if the production function were Cobb-Douglas (so that δ = 0, or equiva-
lently σ = 1). Labor’s share of income in the United States has hovered around 0.7 for
some decades. Equation (7) then implies that the short-run wage elasticity is −0.3. One
would then expect the wage elasticity to lie between 0.0 and −0.3, depending on the ex-
tent to which capital has adjusted to the presence of the immigrant influx.
3. A two-good economy with homogeneous labor
I now expand the basic model in several ways. First, I assume that there are two goods
in the economy; one good is produced domestically and the other good is imported6.
Second, I allow for changes in product demand both because immigration may have
changed the price of the domestically produced product (encouraging consumers to
change their quantity demanded) and because immigrants themselves will consume the
product. Finally, I explicitly introduce a supply curve of domestic capital. The resulting
general equilibrium model has much in common with derivations of Marshall’s rules of
derived demand. The technical details are summarized in the Mathematical Appendix.
Two goods are consumed in a large economy: good q is produced domestically and
good y is imported7. To fix ideas, I initially assume that the price of the imported good
y is set in the global marketplace (or, alternatively, that it is produced at constant mar-
ginal cost). In this context, the price of y is the numeraire and set to unity. I will relax
this assumption below and introduce an upward-sloping foreign export supply curve
for y.
Each consumer j has the quasilinear utility function:
U y; qð Þ ¼ yþ gj
qξ−1
ξ
; ð8Þ
where the weight g* reflects the consumer’s relative preference for the domestic good
and may be different for different consumers. I assume that the utility function is quasi-
concave, so that ξ < 1. Let Z be the consumer’s income. The budget constraint is given
by:
Z ¼ yþ pq: ð9Þ
Utility maximization implies that the product demand function for the domestic good
is:
qj ¼ gj p−1= 1−ξð Þ; ð10Þ
where qj is the amount of the good consumed by consumer j; and gj is the rescaled
person-specific weight. The quasilinear functional form for the utility function implies
that the consumer’s demand for the domestic product does not depend on his income.
The assumption that there are no wealth effects will also be relaxed below.
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consumers in other countries. Let CL be the number of domestic workers, CK be the
number of domestic capitalists, and CX be the number of consumers in the “rest of the
world”8. I assume that all consumers have the same quasilinear utility function in (8),
but that the weighting factor g may differ among the various types of consumers. The
total quantity demanded by domestic consumers (QD) and foreign consumers (QX) is
then given by:
QD ¼ gL CL þ gK CK
 
p−1= 1−ξð Þ; ð11aÞ
QX ¼ gXCXp−1= 1−ξð Þ: ð11bÞ
Balanced trade requires that expenditures on the imported good y equal the value ofthe exports of good q:
wLþ rK− gLCL þ gKCK
 
p−ξ= 1−ξð Þ ¼ gX CXp−ξ= 1−ξð Þ; ð12Þ
where (wL + rK) gives the total payment to domestic factors of production L and K. In
a competitive market, the payment to each factor of production equals its value of
marginal product. If the production function is linear homogeneous, Euler’s theorem
implies that the expression in (12) can be rewritten as:
wLþ rK ¼ p f LLþ f KKð Þ ¼ pQ ¼ gLCL þ gK CK þ gXCX
 
p−ξ= 1−ξð Þ: ð13Þ
where fi is the marginal product of factor i. It follows that aggregate market demand
for the domestic good is given by:
Q ¼ Cp−1= 1−ξð Þ; ð14Þ
where C = gLCL + gKCK + gxCX, the (weighted) number of consumers.
An important question arises: How does an immigration-induced increase in the size
of the workforce affect the size of the consumer base for the domestic product?9 Let C(L)
be the function that relates the number of consumers to the number of workers, and let
ϕ = d log C/d log L. An important special case occurs when the elasticity ϕ = 1, so that
the immigrant influx leads to a proportionately equal increase in the (weighted) num-
ber of consumers and the number of workers. I will refer to the assumption that
ϕ = 1 as the case of product market neutrality. The “neutrality,” of course, refers to the
fact that the immigration-induced supply shift leads to the same relative increase in
the size of the consumer base and in the size of the workforce.
It is easy to allow for different product demand preferences between immigrants and
natives by allowing for non-neutrality, i.e., by allowing for deviations from unity in the
elasticity ϕ. For example, if immigrants prefer consuming the imported good, an immi-
grant influx that increases the size of the workforce by x percent may lead to a smaller
percent increase in the number of “effective” consumers for the domestic good.
Equation (14) shows that an immigration-induced supply shift will have two distinct
effects in the domestic labor market through product demand: First, the price of the
domestic good might change, moving current consumers along the existing product de-
mand curve; second, because immigrants are themselves “new” consumers, the market
product demand curve will shift out and the magnitude of this shift will depend on ϕ10.
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function:
p ¼ CηQ−η; ð15Þ
where η is the inverse price elasticity of demand, with η = 1 − ξ > 0, where the strict in-
equality follows from the assumed quasiconcavity of the utility function in (8).
The production technology for the domestic product is given by the CES production
function:
Q ¼ αK δ þ 1−αð ÞLδ 1=δ; ð16Þ
where the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is σ = 1/(1 − δ).
Finally, the supply of domestic capital is given by the inverse supply function:
r ¼ Kλ; ð17Þ
where λ ≥ 0, and is the inverse elasticity of supply of capital. The two special cases
introduced in the previous section for the short run and the long run correspond to
λ = ∞ and λ = 0, respectively.
In a competitive market, input prices equal the value of marginal product:
r ¼ α CηQ1−δ−ηK δ−1: ð18aÞ
w ¼ 1−αð ÞCηQ1−δ−η Lδ−1: ð18bÞ
Let d log L represent the immigration-induced percent change in the size of theworkforce. By differentiating Equations (18a) and (18b), and allowing for the fact that
the supply of capital is given by Equation (17), it can be shown that:11
d logw
d logL
¼ −λ 1−δ−ηð Þ sK
1þ λ−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð Þ sK −
1þ λ−δð Þη 1−ϕð Þ
1þ λ−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð ÞsK : ð19Þ
Consider initially the special case of product market neutrality (i.e., ϕ = 1), so thatimmigration expands the size of the consumer pool by the same proportion as its ex-
pansion of the workforce. The wage elasticity then reduces to:
d logw
d logL

ϕ¼1
¼ −λ 1−δ−ηð Þ sK
1þ λ−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð Þ sK :
ð19aÞ
In the long run, λ = 0 and the wage elasticity goes to zero. Note also that the denom-inator of Equation (19a) is unambiguously positive12. As long as there is incomplete
capital adjustment (λ > 0), therefore, the wage elasticity will be negative if (1 − δ − η) > 0.
Define η* to be the elasticity of product demand (i.e., η* = 1/η). It is then easy to show that
(1 − δ − η) > 0 implies that:
η > σ: ð20Þ
In other words, even after allowing for a full response by all consumers in the prod-uct market, the wage effect of immigration will be negative if there is incomplete cap-
ital adjustment and if it is easier for consumers to substitute among the available goods
than it is for producers to substitute between labor and capital. This latter condition, of
course, has a familiar ring in labor economics—as it happens to be identical to the
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labor’s share of income leads to more elastic demand “only when the consumer can
substitute more easily than the entrepreneur” (Hicks, 1932, p. 246).
It turns out, however, that the condition in Equation (20) arises independently in a
political economy model of immigration. In particular, the restriction that η* > σ is a
second-order condition to the problem faced by a social planner trying to determine
the optimal amount of immigration in the context of the current model. One important
feature of the competitive market model presented in this section is that the wage-
setting rule ignores the fact that an additional immigrant affects product demand, so
that the marginal revenue product of an immigrant is not equal to his value of marginal
product. Suppose a social planner internalizes this externality and wishes to admit the
immigrant influx that maximizes gross domestic product net of any costs imposed by
immigration13. More precisely, the social planner wishes to maximize:
Ω ¼ pQ−Fh ¼ CηQ1−η−Fh; ð21Þ
where F gives the number of immigrants and h gives the (constant) cost of admitting
an additional immigrant (perhaps in terms of providing social services, etc.). For simpli-
city, consider the case with product market neutrality. In the Mathematical Appendix, I
show that the second-order conditions for this maximization problem are satisfied if:14
1−ηð Þ > 0; and 1−δ−ηð Þ > 0: ð22Þ
In short, as long as the size of the immigrant influx is optimal, the wage elasticity inEquation (19a) must be negative. In that case, the scale effect resulting from immigra-
tion—regardless of whether it occurs through an expansion of the capital stock or
through an expansion in product demand—can never be sufficiently strong to lead to a
wage increase.
It is easy to measure the size of the scale effect triggered by immigration by consider-
ing the simple case of a Cobb-Douglas economy in the short run. The wage elasticity
in (19a) then collapses to:
d logw
d logL

ϕ¼1
δ¼0
λ¼∞
¼ − 1−ηð ÞsK : ð23Þ
By contrasting this elasticity with the analogous effect in the one-good model pre-
sented in Equation (7), it is easy to see that the scale effect of immigration equals ηsK.
In the absence of the scale effect, the wage elasticity would equal −0.3. If the inverse
elasticity of product demand is 0.5 (implying a product demand elasticity of 2.0), the
wage elasticity would fall to −0.15. In other words, the short-run adverse effect of im-
migration on the wage can be greatly alleviated through increased product demand—as
long as the product demand elasticity is sizable.
It is important to emphasize that the wage effect will not disappear in the long run if
the product market neutrality assumption does not hold. Consider, for example, the
case where immigration does not expand the size of the consumer base as rapidly as it
expands the size of the workforce (i.e., ϕ < 1). The second term in (19) is then negative
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duction because there are “too many” workers and “too few” consumers. This result
has interesting implications for the study of immigration when immigrants send a large
fraction of their earnings to the sending country in the form of remittances. The nega-
tive effect of remittances on wages in the receiving country is permanent; it does not
disappear even after capital has fully adjusted to the immigrant influx. Note, however,
that it is also possible for immigration to generate permanent wage gains if ϕ > 1 and
the immigrants are “conspicuous consumers” of the domestic product15.
The wage consequences of even slight deviations from product market neutrality can
be sizable. As an illustration, consider the long run effect in a Cobb-Douglas economy.
The first term in Equation (19) vanishes and the wage elasticity reduces to:
d logw
d logL

δ¼0
λ¼0
¼ −η 1−ϕð Þ
1− 1−ηð Þ sK : ð24Þ
Suppose that ϕ = 0.8, so that an immigration-induced doubling of the workforce in-creases the size of the consumer pool by 80 percent. Suppose again that the inverse
elasticity of product demand η is 0.5. Equation (24) then predicts that the long-run
wage elasticity of immigration will equal −0.12.
Immigration and prices
The wage elasticity in Equation (19) gives the wage impact of immigration in terms of
the price of the imported product (i.e., the numeraire). It is also of interest to determine
the impact of immigration relative to the price of the domestically produced good.
After all, immigration has domestic product price effects both because the wage drops
and because immigrants themselves shift the product demand curve outwards16. By dif-
ferentiating Equation (15) with respect to the immigration-induced supply shift, it can
be shown that the effect of immigration on the domestic price is:
d logp
d logL
¼ ληsK
1þ λ−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð ÞsK −
η 1−ϕð Þ λþ 1−δð ÞsL½ 
1þ λ−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð ÞsK : ð25Þ
Suppose there is product market neutrality. The second term of (25) then vanishes,and immigration has no price effects in the long run (λ = 0). However, Equation (25)
shows that immigration must increase prices as long as the product demand curve is
downward sloping (η > 0) and capital has not fully adjusted. The inflationary effect of
immigration is attenuated (and potentially reversed) if ϕ < 1 and product demand does
not rise proportionately with the size of the immigrant influx.
The prediction that domestic prices rise at the same time that wages fall seems
counterintuitive. However, it is easy to understand the economic factors underlying this
result by noting that the derivative in (25) can also be expressed as:
d logp
d logL
¼ η sK 1− d logKd logL
 
−η 1−ϕð Þ: ð26Þ
As long as there is product market neutrality, the price of the domestic good mustrise whenever capital adjusts by less than the immigration-induced percent shift in
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immigration-induced increase in domestic product demand cannot be easily met by the
existing mix of inputs, raising the price of the domestic product17.
An important question, of course, is: what happens to the real wage defined in terms
of the price of the domestic product (or w/p)? By combining results from Equations
(19) and (25), it is easy to show that:
_w ¼ d log w=pð Þ
d logL
¼ −λ 1−δð Þ sK
1þ λ−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð ÞsK −
η 1−ϕð Þ 1−δð Þ sK
1þ λ−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð ÞsK : ð27Þ
Note that if the product market neutrality assumption holds, the second term in (27)
vanishes and immigration must reduce the real wage as long as capital does not fully
adjust. This result does not depend on the relative magnitudes of the elasticities of sub-
stitution and product demand. The negative impact of immigration on the real wage is
not surprising. After all, immigration reduces the nominal wage and increases the do-
mestic price simultaneously. To simplify the discussion, I will refer to the elasticity in
(27) as the real wage elasticity of immigration.
In order to get a sense of the magnitude of the real wage elasticity, it is instructive to
refer back to the simplest example: a Cobb-Douglas economy in the short run.
Equation (27) collapses to:
d log w=pð Þ
d logL

δ¼0
λ¼∞
¼ −sK : ð28Þ
The short-run real wage elasticity is identical to that implied by the simplest one-
good Cobb-Douglas model in Equation (7). Even after the model accounts for the fact
that immigrants increase the size of the consumption base proportionately and that
immigration-induced price changes move the pre-existing consumers along their prod-
uct demand curve, the short-run real wage elasticity is still −0.3.
The theory of factor demand clarifies an important misunderstanding: the often-
heard argument that the outward shift in product demand induced by immigration
will somehow return the economy to its pre-immigration equilibrium does not have
any theoretical support. Instead, the theory reveals that immigration has an adverse
effect on the real wage18. Put differently, the number of domestically produced widgets
that the typical worker in the receiving country can potentially buy will decline as the
result of the immigrant influx—even after one accounts for the fact that immigrants
themselves will increase the demand for widgets. And, under some conditions, the
decline in the number of widgets that can be purchased is exactly the same as the
decline found in the simplest factor demand model that ignores the role of immigrants
in the widget product market.
4. Extensions of the homogeneous labor model
The model summarized in the previous section incorporates two important restric-
tions. First, the product demand function for the domestic good q does not depend on
the consumer’s income; second, the price of good y is fixed (so that the foreign export
supply curve for y is perfectly elastic). I now extend the framework by relaxing both of
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demand for good y. Suppose the typical consumer’s demand function for the imported
good can be written as:
yj ¼ hj p−
1
τ
y p
1
τ−1Zj; ð29Þ
where hj is a person-specific shifter detailing a consumer’s relative preference for good
y; py is the price of good y; p continues to be the price of good q; and Zj is the con-
sumer’s income. The consumer’s income is equal to w if he is a worker in the domestic
economy; r is he is a capitalist in the domestic economy; and x if he is a consumer in
the “rest of the world”. The weight h may differ among the various types of
consumers.
The parameter τ is positive and is the inverse price elasticity of demand for good y19.
The demand function in (29) builds in two properties. First, consumers have homo-
thetic preferences (implying that the income elasticity is unity). Second, the demand
function is homogeneous of degree zero, so that the three elasticities defined in (29)
add up to zero.
The aggregate demand for the imported good is given by:
Y ¼ p−1τy p1τ−1 hLCLwþ hKCKr þ hXCXxð Þ: ð30Þ
Let Vy = hL CL w + hK CK r + hX CX x, the “effective” wealth that determines aggregatedemand for the imported good20. The inverse demand function for Y can then be
written as:
py ¼ Y −τp1−τV τy: ð31Þ
The aggregate supply curve for Y is given by:py ¼ Y φ; ð32Þ
where φ is the inverse elasticity of supply. The equilibrium price of good y is deter-
mined by the simultaneous solution of Equations (31) and (32).
The aggregate demand curve for the domestic good Q when there are wealth effects
can be derived in an analogous fashion and is given by:
Q ¼ p−1η p
1
η−1
y V q; ð33Þ
where Vq = gLCL w + gK CK r + gX CX x, and measures the effective wealth that deter-
mines aggregate demand for the domestic good21. The demand function in (33) is also
derived from homothetic preferences and is homogeneous of degree zero. By substitut-
ing in the expression for the equilibrium price of good y, it is possible to solve for the
inverse aggregate demand function for the domestic good:
p ¼ Q−η^ V η^q V φ^y ; ð34Þ
where η^ and φ^ are rescaled values of the parameters η and φ, respectively22. Analogous
to the restrictions in Equation (22), the second-order conditions for the social planner
problem now imply that η^ < 1 (which, in turn, implies that η < 1). It then follows that
φ^ must also lie between zero and one. Note that η^ = η and φ^ = 0 when the supply
curve for the imported good is perfectly elastic.
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function in the model that ignored wealth effects and assumed that the supply of Y was
perfectly elastic. In the simpler model, the inverse demand function for Q was p =Q− η Cη,
and the shifter was simply the (weighted) number of consumers who purchased the do-
mestic good. Even if the supply curve of Y were perfectly elastic (implying φ^ = 0), the
shifter in Equation (34) differs because it depends not only on the number of consumers,
but also on their wealth.
The presence of wealth effects implies that the impact of immigration on wages in
the domestic labor market now depends on: (a) how immigration changes the size of
the consumer base for each of the two goods; and (b) how immigration changes the
average income of the consumer base. The first of these effects, of course, is related to
the product market neutrality assumption. Suppose that the pay rate to each of the
groups that make up the consumer base (i.e., w, r, and x) is held constant. The
immigration-induced percent change in the size of the consumer base for the domestic
good is given by:
ϕq ¼
d logVq
d logL

w;r;x
¼ εqDsL
d logCL
d logL
þ εqDsK
d logCK
d logL
þ 1−εqDð Þ
d logCX
d logL
; ð35Þ
where εqD ¼ 1− gXCXx=Vq
 
; the share of total expenditures in good q that is attribut-
able to domestic consumers. The elasticity ϕq, of course, is the counterpart of the elas-
ticity ϕ in the simpler model above.
The impact of immigration on the size of the consumer base for the imported good
is:
ϕy ¼
d logVy
d logL

w;r;x
¼ εyDsL
d logCL
d logL
þ εyDsK
d logCK
d logL
þ 1−εyDð Þ
d logCX
d logL
; ð36Þ
where εyD ¼ 1− hXCXx=Vy
 
; the share of total expenditures in good y that is attribut-
able to domestic consumers. If much of the output of the domestic good is consumed
domestically, while much of the output of the imported good is consumed abroad, it
would be reasonable to expect that the elasticity ϕq would be relatively large (perhaps
nearing one), while the elasticity ϕy would be relatively small.
One final issue needs to be addressed before I can calculate the wage elasticity in the
domestic labor market. It is clear from the definitions of Vq and Vy that the immigration-
induced wealth effect will also depend on what happens to x, the pay rate in the foreign
economy. For simplicity, I assume that immigration (though it may be large relative to the
size of the domestic workforce) is small relative to the size of the workforce in the rest of
the world. Hence I ignore any potential effects on consumer demand (and the domestic
labor market) through the change in the level of foreign income x.
The mathematical appendix describes the solution of this model. The resulting
expressions are more complex because of the rapidly exploding number of elasticities
(and income shares) required to describe all the feedback effects in the model. To sim-
plify, I consider the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function. Further, I restrict the
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elasticity in the expanded model is then given by:
d log w=pð Þ
d logL

δ¼0
¼ −λ 1−η^ ε
q
D−φ^ ε
y
Dð Þ sK
Δ
þ
η^ ϕq−1
	 

þ φ^ϕy
Δ
; ð37Þ
where Δ ¼ 1þ λð Þ 1−η^ εqD sL−φ^ εyD sL½ − 1−η^ð Þ þ η^ λεqD þ φ^ λεyD½ sK .
It is instructive to compare the real wage elasticity in Equation (37) with the analo-
gous expression in (27), which ignored wealth effects and assumed the supply of the
imported good y was perfectly elastic23. For simplicity, suppose that “generalized”
product market neutrality holds, so that the second term in both Equation (27) and
Equation (37) vanishes24. It is easy to see that the numerator of (37) contains the add-
itional term λ η^ εqD þ φ^ εyDð Þ sK . This additional term represents two distinct scale effects
induced by the changing wealth of consumers. Both of these scale effects are positive,
so that they weaken the adverse labor market impact of immigration as long as capital
has not fully adjusted.
The first wealth effect (the term multiplied by η^ ) arises because immigration neces-
sarily increases average income in the domestic economy. In other words, as is typical
in this type of model, the losses incurred by workers are more than made up by the
gains accruing to capitalists (Borjas 1995). The wealth effect generated by the higher
average income increases demand for the domestically produced good, increases the
demand for labor, and helps to attenuate the adverse labor market impact of immigra-
tion. The second wealth effect (the term multiplied by φ^ ) arises because immigration
also generates increased demand for the imported good y. If the supply curve of the
imported good is not perfectly elastic, however, the wealth effect increases the price of
the imported good, encouraging consumers to switch back to the domestic good, fur-
ther attenuating the adverse impact of immigration on the domestic wage.
Despite the additional complexity, Equation (37) yields three unambiguous results as
long as there is generalized product market neutrality:
1. The real wage elasticity is zero in the long run (i.e., when λ = 0).
2. As shown in the mathematical appendix, the real wage elasticity in (37) must be
negative as long as there is incomplete capital adjustment25. In other words, the
scale effects generated by the immigration-induced changes in consumer demand
can never be sufficiently strong to reverse the direct adverse impact of immigration
in the domestic labor market.
3. The short-run effect of immigration is given by:
d log w=pð Þ
d logL

δ¼0
λ¼∞
¼ −sK : ð38Þ
Remarkably, we have come full circle to the beginning of the analysis (see Equation (7)).The short-run real wage elasticity of immigration is still −0.3, even after the model
accounts for all the feedback possibilities introduced by wealth effects in the product
market and inelastic supply of the imported good26.
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The presence of heterogeneous labor implies that the impact of immigration on the
wage of any single group of workers depends on how immigration affects the supply of
every group of workers. In both theoretical and empirical work, therefore, the need
arises to reduce the dimensionality of the problem, typically by limiting the types of
permissible cross-effects among inputs. The need for tractability becomes more acute if
one wishes to allow for the presence of heterogeneous labor in the general equilibrium
model presented in the previous sections.
The nested CES framework is relatively tractable and has become popular in the immi-
gration literature27. In particular, think of the labor input L as a labor aggregate—an ag-
glomeration of workers belonging to different skill groups. The Armington aggregator
that combines different labor inputs is given by:
L ¼ θ1Lβ1 þ θ2Lβ2
h i1=β
; ð39Þ
where Li gives the number of workers in group i; the elasticity of substitution between
groups 1 and 2 is defined by σ12 = 1/(1 − β), with β ≤ 1; and θ1 + θ2 = 1. Although the ex-
position uses two different labor inputs, it will be evident that all of the results extend to
any number of inputs.
Immigrants can shift the supply of either of the two groups. Let mi = dLi/Li give the
immigration-induced percent supply shift for group i. It is easy to show that the per-
cent shift in the aggregate labor input is given by:
d logL ¼ s1
sL
m1 þ s2sL m2 ¼ m; ð40Þ
where si is the share of income accruing to group i, and sL = s1 + s2. Equation (40) re-
veals an interesting property of the nested CES framework: It is not necessary to know
the value of the elasticity of substitution σ12 to calculate the size of the immigration-
induced shift in the labor aggregate L. All of the pertinent information is contained in
the income shares accruing to the various skill groups.
The modeling of product demand in a market with heterogeneous labor requires
particular attention as workers differ in their productivity and inevitably have different
resources when they enter the product market. It is easier to grasp the intuition by con-
sidering the simpler version of the general equilibrium model presented in Section 3
that ignores wealth effects and assumes that the supply of the imported good is per-
fectly elastic28.
In that framework, the inverse product demand function was given by p = CηQ− η,
where the effective number of consumers for the domestic good is C = gLCL + gKCK +
gxCX. I use the same market demand function in the heterogeneous labor model. The
fact that workers are heterogeneous—and that this heterogeneity affects aggregate
demand—can be easily captured by positing that CL = ƒ(L). Hence the shifter in the
inverse product demand function depends on the efficiency units-adjusted number of
workers. Those workers who are more productive and have higher wages “count” pro-
portionately more in the aggregation.
The model, therefore, consists of the inverse product market demand function in
Equation (15), the aggregate production function in Equation (16), the inverse supply
Borjas IZA Journal of Migration Page 14 of 252013, 2:22
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/22curve of capital in Equation (17), and the Armington aggregator in Equation (39). The
condition that the wage of input i equals the group’s value of marginal product is:
wi ¼ 1−αð ÞCηQ1−δ−η Lδ−1
 
θi L
1−β Lβ−1i : ð41Þ
It is obvious that the marginal productivity condition for the price of capital is identi-cal to that found in the homogeneous labor model in Equation (18a). Equally import-
ant, the marginal productivity condition for skill group i in Equation (41) is very
similar to that obtained in the homogeneous labor model in Equation (18b). In fact, the
bracketed term in (41) is identical to the value of marginal product of labor in the
homogeneous labor case. The fact that there are now two different skill groups simply
adds the multiplicative term that appears to the right of the bracket.
Define w to be equal to the bracketed term in (41). By differentiating Equation (41)
and using the supply shift defined in (40), it is easy to show that the effect of immigra-
tion on the wage of group i is given by:
d logwi ¼ d logwþ 1−βð Þd logLþ β−1ð Þd logLi;
¼ d logwþ 1−βð Þ m−mið Þ: ð42Þ
Equation (42) has a number of important properties. Suppose, for instance, that we
are interested in the impact of immigration on the relative wage of the two skill groups.
The distributional effect is given by:
d logw1−d logw2 ¼ − 1
σ12
m1−m2ð Þ: ð43Þ
Equation (43) establishes an important property of the nested CES framework: theimpact of immigration on relative wages depends only on the elasticity of substitution
between the two groups and is proportional to the relative supply shift. If the two
groups are perfect substitutes, immigration has no relative wage effect. If the two
groups are imperfect substitutes, the group that experiences the larger supply shock
will always experience a decline in its relative wage29. None of the “fundamentals” that
play a role in the homogeneous labor model (i.e., η, λ, σ, and ϕ) help determine the dis-
tributional impact. For instance, the relative wage effect does not depend on the extent
to which capital adjusts to the immigrant influx30.
In addition to any distributional effects, immigration also has an impact on the aggre-
gate wage level, where d logw ¼ s1 d logw1 þ s2 d logw2ð Þ=sL: Equation (42) implies that:
d logw ¼ d logw: ð44Þ
In short, the impact of immigration on the average wage in a model with heteroge-
neous labor is identical to the impact of immigration on the wage in a model with
homogeneous labor, as given by Equation (19)31. For instance, in a Cobb-Douglas world
with perfectly elastic product demand, the homogeneous labor model predicts that the
wage elasticity of immigration will lie between −0.3 (in the short run) and 0.0 (in the
long run). Even with heterogeneous labor, it must still be the case that the wage
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wage effect has been “pre-determined” (by the values of the fundamentals η, λ, σ, and
ϕ), and is independent of whatever complementarities may or may not exist among
labor inputs in the production process.
The imperfect substitution among skill groups helps to position the wage effect for
each of the groups around this pre-determined average wage effect. Suppose, for in-
stance, that an immigrant influx doubles the size of the (efficiency-units adjusted)
workforce. In a Cobb-Douglas world, the short-run wage impact on one group will typ-
ically be larger than −0.3, while the wage impact on the other group will typically be
smaller than −0.3. For a given σ12, the specific deviations from −0.3 will depend on: a)
the disparity in the supply shocks experienced by the two groups; and b) the income
shares of the groups, since the weighted average of the two wage effects has to be iden-
tically equal to −0.3. Put differently, the constraints imposed by factor demand theory
and by the functional form of the nested CES framework greatly restrain the structure
of immigration wage effects that can possibly be estimated by any data.
Moreover, even a generalization of the model that would instead specify a linear
homogenous production function at the top level of the nesting introduces equally ar-
bitrary numerical restrictions. The linear homogeneity assumption implies that the
long-run average wage impact must be zero, so that one group will typically gain
slightly and the other group will typically lose.
It is worth emphasizing these insights in a different way. Numerous published simu-
lations claim that data analysis based on structural factor demand models implies that
the impact of immigration on the wage of the average worker is x percent, or that the
impact on the wage of the average worker in a particular skill group is y percent. These
simulations uniformly use a linear homogeneous (and often a Cobb-Douglas) aggregate
production function. As we have seen, these functional form assumptions build in nu-
merically what the mean wage effect of immigration must have been. The (absolute)
long-run wage effects reported by these studies have nothing to do with the underlying
data; they are simply regurgitating the constraints imposed by factor demand theory
(i.e., the average wage effect must be zero). And even the short-run wage effects are simply
spewing out the numerical implications of the presumed Cobb-Douglas technology.Imperfect substitution between immigrants and natives
Some recent studies (Card 2009; Ottaviano and Peri 2012; Manacorda et al. 2012) argue
that immigrants and natives within a skill group are imperfect substitutes—and that
the resulting complementarities may greatly attenuate the adverse wage impact of im-
migration on the pre-existing workforce32. These models typically expand the nested
CES framework by adding yet another level that aggregates the contribution of immi-
grants and natives in skill group i:
Li ¼ ρNNγi þ ρFFγi
 1=γ
; ð45Þ
where Ni and Fi give the number of native and foreign-born workers in skill group i,
respectively; the elasticity of substitution between native and immigrant workers is
σNF = 1/(1 − γ), with γ ≤ 1; and ρN + ρF = 1.
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workers. For skill group i, these conditions are:
wNi ¼ 1−αð ÞCηQ1−δ−η Lδ−1
 
θiL
1−βLβ−1i
	 

ρNL
1−γ
i N
γ−1
i
	 

; ð46aÞ
wFi ¼ 1−αð ÞCηQ1−δ−η Lδ−1
 
θiL
1−βLβ−1i
	 

ρFL
1−γ
i F
γ−1
i
	 

; ð46bÞ
where wNi and w
F
i give the wage of native and immigrant workers in group i,
respectively.
By comparing Equations (46a) and (46b) with Equation (41), it is obvious that the
presence of within-group imperfect substitution simply adds yet another multiplicative
term to the marginal productivity conditions. The bracketed term still represents the
“average” wage in the economy, aggregated across all skill groups. This is the wage
level determined by the factor demand theory parameters discussed in Section 3. The
product of this bracketed term and θiL1−βL
β−1
i gives Equation (41), the mean wage for
group i.
The multiplicative separability property allows us to easily assess the potential im-
portance of immigrant-native complementarities in the evolution of the wage structure.
Differentiating Equations (46a) and (46b) gives the impact of a supply shift on the wage
of native and immigrant workers in group i:
d logwNi ¼ d logwþ 1−βð Þ d logL−d logLi½  þ 1−γð Þ d logLi−d logNi½ : ð47Þ
d logwFi ¼ d logwþ 1−βð Þ d logL−d logLi½  þ 1−γð Þ d logLi−d logFi½ : ð48Þ
Suppose a supply shock changes the number of immigrants in each of the skill
groups, but leaves the number of native workers unchanged. Let m be the
immigration-induced percent change in the efficiency units-adjusted size of the work-
force, and mi be the percent change in the size of the efficiency units-adjusted work-
force in skill group i. The “averaging property” in Equation (40) implies that these
supply shifts are given by:
d logL ¼ m ¼ s1
sL
m1 þ s2sL m2; ð49Þ
d logLi ¼ mi ¼ s
F
i
si
f i; ð50Þ
where sFi is the share of income accruing to immigrants in group i (with s
F
i þ sNi ¼ si);
and fi = dFi/Fi, the percent increase in the size of the foreign-born workforce in that
group.
The presence of within-group imperfect substitution can have important conse-
quences for within-group inequality. The relative wage effect is:
d logwFi −d logw
N
i ¼ −
1
σNF
f i: ð51Þ
The distributional effect in (51) depends only on the elasticity of substitution between
immigrants and natives and on the size of the increase in group i’s foreign-born work-
force. In the nested CES framework, the value of the elasticity σNF does not have any
other implications. For instance, consider the impact of immigration on the average
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=si. It
is easy to show that:
d logwi ¼ d logwþ 1−βð Þ m−mið Þ; ð52Þ
which is identical to Equation (42), the implied wage effect in the simpler model that
assumed that immigrants and natives in a skill group were perfect substitutes. Put dif-
ferently, the value of σNF does not influence the shape of the wage distribution across
skill groups. It is trivial to move up yet another level in the CES nesting and calculate
the average wage effect across skill groups. This exercise would again yield equation
(44), so that the average wage effect would be independent from both σ12 and σNF.
The nested CES framework, therefore, imposes an important restriction on any study
of the distributional impact of immigration: The wage impact at a particular level of
the nesting depends only on the elasticities that enter the model at or above that level,
and does not depend on any of the elasticities that enter the model below that level.
Hence the impact of immigration on the aggregate wage does not depend on the value
of the elasticity of substitution across skill groups or on the presence or absence of
within-group complementarities. Similarly, the impact of immigration on the wage of a
particular skill group is unaffected by within-group complementarities between immi-
grants and natives.
6. Summary
This paper presents the analytics that underlie the study of the wage effects of immi-
gration. The general equilibrium framework reveals that the effect of immigration on
the mean wage depends on the parameters that Marshall first identified in his famous
rules of derived demand (i.e., the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital,
the supply elasticity of capital, the elasticity of product demand, and labor’s share of in-
come). The immigration context also shows the importance of an additional parameter:
the impact of immigration on the size of the consumer base relative to its impact on
the size of the workforce. The analysis reveals that the short-run wage effect of immi-
gration can be negative in a wide array of possible scenarios, and that even the long
run effect of immigration may be negative if the impact of immigration on the potential
size of the consumer base is smaller than its impact on the size of the workforce. Inter-
estingly, however, the analysis also demonstrates that both the short- and long-run
effects could be positive if immigration increases the size of the consumer base for the
domestic product dramatically.
The simplicity of the factor demand framework (combined with specification restric-
tions on the production technology) also leads to closed-form solutions of the wage effect
of immigration. As a result, it is easy to conduct back-of-the-envelope calculations of the
predicted wage effect. The constraints imposed by the theory of labor demand can then
be used to assess the plausibility of the many contradictory claims that are often made
about how immigration affects the wage structure in sending and receiving countries.
The theoretical framework presented in this paper can be extended in a number of
ways. For instance, the domestic economy can produce different types of goods (some
may be labor-intensive and some may be capital-intensive; some may be traded and others
non-traded). An immigration-induced supply shift would induce flows of resources among
the various sectors. It would be of interest to determine whether the aggregate wage
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affected by the leveraging possibilities introduced by the multi-sector framework.
The paper also points to a new direction for empirical research. The theoretical
framework, after all, highlights the importance of determining how immigration
changes the relative number (and wealth) of consumers in the receiving country. The
theory clearly demonstrates that an imbalance between the impact of immigration on
the size of the consumer base and its impact on the size of the workforce can generate
permanent wage effects. It seems, therefore, that the consumption behavior of immi-
grants is a topic ripe for empirical investigation.Endnotes
1Hicks (1932) gives the classic presentation of Marshall’s rules of derived demand.
Ewerhart (2003) and Kennan (1998) provide much simpler (and clearer) derivations.
2For instance, Wagner (2009) represents the first to attempt to isolate empirically the
substitution and scale effects of an immigration-induced supply shift.
3The elasticity of complementarity is the dual of the elasticity of substitution.
Hamermesh (1993) presents a detailed discussion of the properties of the elasticity of
complementarity; see also Hicks (1970) and Sato and Tetsunori (1973).
4The labor supply of the pre-existing workforce is assumed to be perfectly inelastic.
The immigration-induced supply shift can then be illustrated as an outward shift of a
vertical supply curve.
5The elasticities of complementarity implied by the CES function are cKL = (1 − δ)
and cLL = −(1 − δ)(sK/sL).
6The introduction of a second good is crucial if one wishes to examine how immigra-
tion affects aggregate product demand and prices. If there were only one good in the
economy, all units of that good are sold regardless of the price. The framework devel-
oped below is related to the standard 2×2×2 model in international trade (Dixit and
Norman 1980).
7The definition of the goods implies that immigration and trade are complements
since there is complete specialization of goods production. If immigration and trade
were substitutes, as in Mundell’s (1957) classic analysis, there may then be factor price
equalization across countries. Immigration would have no wage effects and would only
alter the distribution of outputs as described by the Rybczynski Theorem. I do not ad-
dress the long-running debate over whether immigration and trade are complements
or substitutes. The model presented below is instead designed to depict an economic
environment where wage differences exist and induce labor to migrate internationally.
See Kennan (2013) for an alternative approach that allows for factor price equalization.
8Since there are no wealth effects, it is not necessary to specify what income Z is for
each of the groups. I will give a precise definition when I introduce wealth effects
below.
9As will be shown below, the answer to this question plays a crucial role in determin-
ing the wage impact of immigration. Nevertheless, it has only been addressed empiric-
ally by the pioneering work in Olney (2013).
10The issue of whether immigrants are “new” consumers can be approached in a
number of ways. It could be argued, for instance, that immigration substantially
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/22increases the number of domestic consumers (through the increase in CL), and leads
only to a trivial decline in the relative number of consumers from abroad. Alternatively,
it may be that immigrants change their preferences for the domestic good once they
reside in their new home. Even though the increase in CL may be completely offset by
the decline in CX, the weight determining the post-migration demand of the immi-
grants for the domestic good increases from gX to gL. Moreover, immigration will also
change the number of capitalist-consumers. The value of the elasticity ϕ gives the net
impact of all the possible immigration-induced changes in the size of the consumer
base.
11It is interesting to note that the expression in Equation (19), when evaluated at
ϕ = 0, is equal to the reciprocal of the Hicks-Marshall formula that defines the labor
demand elasticity (d log L/d log w) in the generic derivation of Marshall’s rules; see, for
example, Kennan (1998, p. 6).
12In particular, (1 + λ − δ) – (1 − δ − η)sK = λ + (1 − δ)sL + ηsK. The denominator is
strictly positive since η > 0.
13Benhabib (1996) models the political economy tradeoffs that determine the optimal
choice of an immigration policy.
14The second-order conditions would also be satisfied if cost h was not constant, but
increased with the number of immigrants. Note also that the second-order conditions
in (22) imply that the social planner (like a monopolist) chooses an equilibrium point
where product demand is elastic.
15These conclusions, of course, require that the deviation from product market neu-
trality continue indefinitely, regardless of how long immigrants have been in the receiv-
ing country.
16Recent studies of the price effect of immigration include Lach (2007), Cortes
(2008), and Saiz (2007).
17The response of the capital stock to the immigrant influx is:
d logK
d logL
¼ 1−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð ÞsK
1þ λ−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð ÞsK −
η 1−ϕð Þ
1þ λ−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð ÞsK :
Note that if the product market neutrality assumption holds, the percent shift in the
capital stock will be a fraction (between 0 and 1) of the immigration-induced percent
shift in the size of the workforce.
18There are alternative ways of defining the real wage. For instance, one can define a
price index p ¼ p1−μDy pμD ; where py is the price of good y (which is fixed at 1), and μD is
the share of income that is spent in good y in the domestic economy. Holding constant
the share μD, the resulting real wage elasticity in the case of product market neutrality
is:
d log w=pð Þ
d logL
¼ −λ 1−δ−η 1−μDð Þ½ sK
1þ λ−δð Þ− 1−δ−ηð ÞsK ;
which must be negative if the second-order conditions in Equation (22) hold.
19Goods q and y are gross substitutes or gross complements depending on whether τ
is less than or greater than 1, respectively.
20The simplifying assumption that a domestic consumer’s wealth equals his income
(i.e., w or r) implies that the number of worker-consumers CL must equal the number
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K, so that each capitalist-consumer owns one unit of capital.
21The solution of the model is greatly simplified if there is a proportional relation be-
tween the weighting factors for the domestic and imported goods for both workers and
capitalists. In particular, I assume that hL = υgL and hK = υgK. The proportionality prop-
erty allows expressing the various elasticities in terms of labor’s share of income, sL.
22The rescaled elasticities are defined as η^ ¼ η1−φ 1−τð Þ 1−ηð Þ and φ^ ¼ φ
τ 1−ηð Þ
1−φ 1−τð Þ 1−ηð Þ ; where
φ ¼ φφþτ :
23In the special case where there are no wealth effects and the supply curve of the
imported good is not perfectly elastic, all the terms involving the share ε in equation
(37) would drop out.
24The “generalized” form of product market neutrality required in Equation (37) is
η^ ϕq−1
	 

þ φ^ϕy ¼ 0:
25The proof uses the fact that the rescaled elasticities η^ and φ^ are both positive and
less than one. It is easy to verify that their sum is also less than one. To show that the
sign of the numerator in (37) must be negative, simply evaluate the numerator at the
point where the income shares in the expression take on the value of one, so that the
scale effects are at their maximum value. Using the same numerical properties of the
rescaled elasticities, it can also be shown that the denominator must be positive.
26The real wage can also be defined as the ratio of w to a price index p ¼ p1−ε
q
D
y pε
q
D ,
where the consumption shares in the exponents are treated as constants. A sufficient
condition for the short-run real wage elasticity to be negative is that goods q and y be
gross substitutes (i.e., τ < 1).
27Bowles (1970) introduced the nested CES framework into the labor demand litera-
ture. More recently, it was used by Card and Lemieux (2001) to analyze the evolution
of the wage structure, and by Borjas (2003) to estimate the wage impact of immigra-
tion. As an example of the extreme restrictions that the nested CES framework imposes
on the number of “permissible” cross-effects, consider the empirical analysis in the
Borjas (2003) study. It uses 32 distinct skill groups in the workforce (4 education
groups and 8 age groups), and capital. There are then a total of 1,089 own- and cross-
group effects to estimate. The symmetry restrictions implied by factor demand theory
reduce this number to 561. The nested CES framework assumes that all of these cross-
effects can be described in terms of three elasticities of substitution.
28It is worth emphasizing, however, that all of the results presented below carry
through to the more general model with wealth effects and an upward sloping foreign
export supply curve.
29The implication that relative wage effects are proportional to relative supply shifts
suggests that one should be skeptical when evaluating the empirical evidence reported
in the literature. After all, it is easy to manipulate results by defining skill groups in
ways that either accentuate the relative supply shift or that mask it. This point was first
illustrated in Borjas et al. (1997). Their simulations show that the wage effect of immi-
gration in the United States is much greater when one compares high school dropouts
to the rest of the workforce than when one compares high school “equivalents” to the
rest of the workforce. The difference arises because “high school equivalents” typically
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a substantial influx of foreign-born high school dropouts, their numerical importance is
obviously very different if the competing group consists only of native high school
dropouts or if it also includes the millions of native high school graduates.
30This implication of the model, of course, is a direct consequence of the assumed
nested CES technology.
31Note, however, that the definition of the supply shift is slightly different. In the
homogeneous labor context, the supply shift is measured by the percent increase in the
size of the workforce, while in the nested CES framework it is measured by the percent
increase in the efficiency units-adjusted size of the workforce.
32As pointed out by Borjas et al. 2008, 2012, however, the original Ottaviano and Peri
(2005) study made sampling decisions that contaminated the analysis. Most conspicu-
ous, Ottaviano and Peri classified millions of native-born currently enrolled high school
juniors and seniors as “high school dropouts.” The simple exclusion of these students
turns their estimate of the elasticity of substitution from about 5 to near infinity. In the
published version of their paper, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) report a far higher value of
the relevant elasticity of substitution than in their initial working paper.
Mathematical appendix
1. Derivation of Equation (19)
The mathematical derivation is greatly simplified by following the approach in Kennan
(1998). First, note that the value of marginal product condition for labor can be written
as:
w
p
¼ 1−αð ÞQ1−δLδ−1: ðA1Þ
By substituting the inverse product demand curve into (A1), it is easy to show that:
logw ¼ η log C þ log 1−αð Þ þ 1−η−δð Þ log Qþ δ−1ð Þ log L: ðA2Þ
Differentiating with respect to the immigrant supply shift yields:d logw
d logL
¼ ηϕþ 1−η−δð Þ d logQ
d logL
þ δ−1ð Þ: ðA3Þ
Note that the ratio of input prices in a CES technology can be written as a simplefunction of the ratio of input quantities. In particular:
w
r
¼ 1−αð ÞL
δ−1
αKδ−1
: ðA4Þ
Differentiating this expression, while accounting for the fact that r = Kλ, yields:
d logK
d logL
¼ 1
1þ λ−δ
d logw
d logL
þ 1−δð Þ
 
: ðA5Þ
Finally, the CES production function implies that:
d logQ
d logL
¼ sK d logKd logL þ sL: ðA6Þ
Equation (19) can be derived by substituting equations (A5) and (A6) into (A3).
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The maximization problem faced by the social planner is:
Max Ω ¼ pQ−Fh ¼ CηQ1−η−Fh: ðA7Þ
Suppose that there is product market neutrality. Without loss of generality, let C = L.The first-order condition that determines the optimal number of immigrants is:
∂Ω
∂F
¼ ηLη−1Q1−η þ 1−αð Þ 1−ηð ÞL− 1−δ−ηð ÞQ1−δ−η−h ¼ 0: ðA8Þ
The second order condition is given by:
∂2Ω
∂F2
¼ −η 1−ηð ÞLη−2Q1−ηsK− 1−ηð Þ 1−δ−ηð Þ 1−αð ÞLδþη−2Q1−δ−ηsK < 0: ðA9Þ
Sufficient conditions for (A9) to hold are (1 − η) > 0 and (1 − δ − η) > 0.3. The extended model
Equation (34) in the text shows that the aggregate demand function for the domestic
good (after solving out the equilibrium price of good y) is:
p ¼ Q−η^ V η^q V φ^y ; ðA10Þ
where Vq = gLCL w + gKCK r + gX CX x, and Vy = hLCL w + hK CK r + hX CX x. The weights
for domestic consumers in the demand for the imported and domestic goods are as-
sumed to be proportional, so that hL = υgL and hK = υgK. The rescaled elasticities in this
aggregate demand function are defined by:
η^ ¼ η
1−φ 1−τð Þ 1−ηð Þ ; ðA11Þ
φ^ ¼ φ
τ 1−ηð Þ
1−φ 1−τð Þ 1−ηð Þ ; ðA12Þ
φ ¼ φ
φþ τ : ðA13Þ
The inverse demand function in Equation (A10) only makes economic sense (i.e.,price depends negatively on quantity and positively on income) if η^ > 0. As a result, the
denominator of (A11) must be positive. The second-order conditions for the social
planner problem in this extended model will be satisfied if η^ < 1. By using the defin-
ition in (A11), it is easy to demonstrate that the restriction that η^ < 1 also implies that
η is less than 1. Using these properties, it then follows that φ^ must also lie between 0
and 1. These numerical restrictions will be used below.
Suppose the production function is Cobb-Douglas, with Q = KαL1 − α. Using (A10),
one can then differentiate the marginal productivity condition to obtain:
d logw
d logL
¼ −η^ d logQ
d logL
þ η^ d logVq
d logL
þ φ^ d logVy
d logL
þ α d logK
d logL
−α: ðA14Þ
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as a result of the immigration-induced supply shift. It is easy to show that:
d logVq
d logL
¼ gLCLw
Vq
d logCL
d logL
þ gKCKr
V q
d logCK
d logL
þ gXCXx
Vq
d logCX
d logL
þ gLCLw
Vq
d logw
d logL
þ gKCKr
Vq
d logr
d logL
;
ðA15Þ
where I assume that immigration is sufficiently “small” to leave x (i.e., average income
in the “rest of the world”) unchanged. The share of total consumption attributable to
domestic labor or capital must equal the respective income share. Further, the propor-
tionality property between the weights g and h for domestic consumers implies that
Equation (A15) can be rewritten as:
d logVq
d logL
¼ εqDsL
d logCL
d logL
þ εqDsK
d logCK
d logL
þ 1−εqDð Þ
d logCX
d logL
þεqDsL
d logw
d logL
þ εqDsK
d logr
d logL
:
ðA16Þ
Note that the first three terms of (A16) define the elasticity ϕq in Equation (35).Using an analogous strategy, it can be shown that the change in the effective wealth
determining aggregate demand for good y is:
d logVy
d logL
¼ εyDsL
d logCL
d logL
þ εyDsK
d logCK
d logL
þ 1−εyDð Þ
d logCX
d logL
þεyDsL
d logw
d logL
þ εyDsK
d logr
d logL
:
ðA17Þ
The first three terms of (A17) define the elasticity ϕy in Equation (36).
The substitution of Equations (A5), (A6), (A16) and (A17) into Equation (A14) yields:
d logw
d logL
¼
−λ 1−η^ð Þ sk þ η^ λ εqD sK þ φ^ λεyD sK þ 1þ λð Þ η^ ϕq−1
	 

þ φ^ϕy
h i
1þ λð Þ 1−η^ εqD sL−φ^ εyD sL½ − 1−η^ð Þ þ η^ λεqD þ φ^ λεyD½ sK
: ðA18Þ
The Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the real wage equals (w/p) =
(1 − α)KαL− α. Using Equation (A5), the real wage elasticity can then be written as:
d log w=pð Þ
d logL
¼ α d logK
d logL
−α ¼ α
d logw
d logL þ 1
1þ λ −α; ðA19Þ
The expression for the real wage elasticity is obtained by substituting (A18) into(A19). This step yields:
d log w=pð Þ
d logL
¼
−λ sK þ η^ λεqD sK þ φ^ λεyD sK þ η^ ϕq−1
	 

þ φ^ϕy
h i
1þ λð Þ 1−η^ εqD sL−φ^ εyD sL½ − 1−η^ð Þ þ η^ λεqD þ φ^ λεyD½ sK
: ðA20Þ
Suppose that “generalized” product market neutrality holds. The bracketed term in
the numerator of (A20) vanishes.
To show that the real wage elasticity must then be negative, recall that the rescaled
elasticities η^ and φ^ defined in (A11) and (A12) are both greater than zero and less than
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one. The fact that η^ þ φ^ < 1 can be used to prove that the numerator of (A20) must be
negative. In particular, the numerator equals −λ sK 1−η^ ε
q
D−φ^ ε
y
Dð Þ . The maximum value
that the income shares in this expression can attain is 1. In that case, the numerator
equals −λsK 1− η^ þ φ^ð Þ½ . But the sum of the two elasticities η^ and φ^ must be less than
one, hence the numerator is negative.
By using analogous arguments it is possible to show that the denominator of (A20)
is positive. In particular, evaluate the denominator at λ = 0. Using the properties of
the rescaled elasticities noted above, it is easy to show that the denominator is posi-
tive at the lowest possible value of λ. By differentiating the denominator with respect
to λ, it is also possible to show that the denominator is a monotonically increasing
function of λ.
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Migration is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The author declares that
he has observed these principles.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Edward Glaeser, Jeffrey Grogger, Daniel Hamermesh, Gordon Hanson, Lawrence Katz, Dani Rodrik, and
an anonymous referee for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Responsible editor: Amelie F Constant
Author details
1Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. 2NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. 3IZA, Bonn, Germany.
Received: 28 August 2013 Accepted: 25 October 2013
Published:
References
12 Nov 2013Benhabib J (1996) On the political economy of immigration. Eur Econ Rev 40(9):1737–1744
Borjas GJ (1995) The economic benefits from immigration. J Econ Perspect 9(2):3–22
Borjas GJ (2003) The labor demand curve Is downward sloping: reexamining the impact of immigration on the labor
market. Q J Econ 118(4):1335–1374
Borjas GJ, Doran KB (2012) The collapse of the soviet union and the productivity of American mathematicians. Q J Econ
127(3):1143–1203
Borjas GJ, Freeman RB, Katz LF (1997) How much do immigration and trade affect labor market outcomes? Brook Pap
Econ Act 1:1–67
Borjas GJ, Grogger J, Hanson GH (2008) Imperfect substitution between immigrants and natives: a reappraisal.
NBER Working Paper, No. 13887, Cambridge MA
Borjas GJ, Grogger J, Hanson GH (2012) On estimating elasticities of substitution. J Eur Econ Assoc 10(1):198–210
Bowles S (1970) Aggregation of labor inputs in the economics of growth and planning: experiments with a two-level
CES function. J Polit Econ 78(1):68–81
Card D (2001) Immigrant inflows, native outflows, and the local labor market impacts of higher immigration. J Labor
Econ 19(1):22–64
Card D (2005) Is the new immigration really so bad? Economic Journal 115(4):F300–F323
Card D (2009) Immigration and inequality. Am Econ Rev 99(2):1–21
Card D, Lemieux T (2001) Can falling supply explain the rising return to college for younger men? a cohort-based
analysis. Q J Econ 116(2):705–746
Cortes P (2008) The effect of low-skilled immigration on US prices: evidence from CPI data. J Polit Econ 116(3):381–422
Dixit A, Norman V (1980) The theory of international trade: a dual, general equilibrium approach. Cambridge University
Press, New York, General Equilibrium Approach
Ewerhart C (2003) A short and intuitive proof of Marshall’s rule. Economic Theory 22(2):415–418
Hamermesh D (1993) Labor demand. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Hicks JR (1932) The Theory of Wages. Macmillan, London
Hicks JR (1970) Elasticity of substitution again: substitutes and complements. Oxf Econ Pap 22(3):289–296
Kennan J (1998) The Hicks-Marshall rules of derived demand: an expository note. University of Wisconsin, Madison,
Working Paper
Kennan J (2013) Open borders. Rev Econ Dyn 16:L1–L13
Lach S (2007) Immigration and prices. J Polit Econ 115(4):548–587
Manacorda M, Manning A, Wadsworth J (2012) The impact of immigration on the structure of wages: theory and
evidence from Britain. J Eur Econ Assoc 10(1):120–151
Mishra P (2007) Emigration and wages in source countries: evidence from Mexico. J Dev Econ 82(1):180–199
Mundell RA (1957) International trade and factor mobility. Am Econ Rev 47(3):321–335
Olney W (2013) Remittances and the wage impact of immigration. Working Paper, Williams College
Borjas IZA Journal of Migration Page 25 of 252013, 2:22
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/22Ottaviano GIP, Peri G (2005) Rethinking the gains from immigration: theory and evidence from the U.S. NBER Working
Paper, p No. 11672, Cambridge MA
Ottaviano GIP, Peri G (2012) Rethinking the effect of immigration on wages. J Eur Econ Assoc 10(1):152–197
Rasmussen E (2013) How immigration can hurt a country. Indiana University, Working Paper
Saiz A (2007) Immigration and housing rents in American cities. J Urban Econ 61(2):345–371
Sato R, Tetsunori K (1973) On the elasticities of substitution and complementarity. Oxf Econ Pap 25(1):44–56
Wagner M (2009) Understanding the labor market impact of immigration. Working Paper, University of Chicago
Waldinger F (2010) Quality matters: the expulsion of professors and the consequences for PhD student outcomes in
Nazi Germany. J Polit Econ 118(4):787–831Cite this article as: Borjas: The analytics of the wage effect of immigration. IZA Journal of Migration
10.1186/2193-9039-2-22
2013, 2:22Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
